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FURTHER THOUGHTS ON RACE,
AMERICAN LAW, AND THE STATE OF NATURE:
ADVANCING THE MULTIRACIAL PARADIGM SHIFT
AND SEEKING PATTERNS IN THE
AREA OF RACE AND LAW
George A. Martinez*
I. INTRODUCTION
Philosophy reveals what is hidden.' It discloses or makes things
comprehensible or understandable.2 In my article on Race, American Law and
the State of Nature,3 I have sought to use philosophical theory-state of nature
theory-as a way to understand American law and issues of race. Philosophical
state of nature theory reveals or discloses what is often hidden: the nature of race
and American law.
This project is consistent with a recent trend in legal scholarship, which
has been noted by Yishai Blank, consisting of scholars who seek to "reenchant"
law "by reconnecting it to a transcendental or even divine sphere."' This project
seeks to "uncover . . . hidden meanings" in law "through historical analysis,
cultural critique or philosophical contemplation."' Although there may be a

Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University, B.A. Arizona State
University; M.A. (Philosophy) University of Michigan; J.D. Harvard University. S. Tucker

Wincele provided helpful research assistance. I would like to thank the Dedman School of Law at
Southern Methodist University and the WWB Law Professors Fund for providing a research grant
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'ROBERT C. SOLOMON, INTRODUCING PHILOSOPHY: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 38 (2nd ed. 1981)

("The world is not as it seems. And the beginnings of both philosophy and science were the first
attempts of men and women to see beyond their 'common sense' views of things and try to find the

reality behind them"); Id. at 46 (According to Plato, "Forms are the ultimate reality. Things change,
people grow old and die, but forms are eternal and unchanging. Thus, Plato could agree with
Heraclitus that the world of our experience is constantly changing, but he could also agree with
Parmenides, who insisted that the real world, the eternal and unchanging world, was not the same
as the world of our experience").
2
Id. at 46 (philosophical reasoning is our "only access" to "a world of ideas, an unchanging world,
the real world or the world of being").
George A. Martinez, Race, American Law and the State of Nature, 112 W. VA. L. REv. 799

(2010).
4 Yishai Blank, The Reenchantment of Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 634 (2011); see also id. at
663 ("The reenchanters articulate an understanding of law that reasserts its inherent morality;
commitment to transcendental wisdom, truth, and values; artful being; and non-positivist
authority"). For examples of the effort to "reenchant" law, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
225-75 (1986) (law and morality); Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious
Dimension of Judicial Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 813 (2004) (advancing an
argument in favor of reenchanting the law and contending that "religious convictions are required

for fully justifying judges' decisions in hard cases").
Blank, supra note 4, at 666-67 (the reenchanters seek to analyze law "through the prism of the
humanities, of philosophy" to reveal "what it means, and what it is").
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tendency for the dominant group to see itself as unknowable or inscrutable,6
philosophical theory is able to reveal the hidden truth.
In my article on the state of nature and race, I have argued that there is a
tendency for the dominant group to relate to racial minorities as if they were in
the state of nature - i.e., a tendency to act as if they were in a situation where
there is absence of legal or moral constraints.' In the state of nature "nothing can
be unjust."' Indeed, the "state of nature is completely amoral."' People have the
right to do whatever they have the power to do.'o In the state of nature, therefore,
there is nothing to limit or constrain one's actions and one acts "unencumbered
by moral scruples.""
In this article, I seek to further develop this state of nature theory by
discussing new examples that illustrate and provide evidence in support of the
theory. In addition, I examine whether it is possible for us to extricate ourselves
from the state of nature and explain how state of nature theory advances a
multiracial paradigm shift in the area of race and is consistent with scientific
practice in that it seeks patterns in the area of race and law. In Part II, I set out a
number of new examples to illustrate state of nature theory, including: (1) amoral
decision-making in the context of affirmative action; (2) the lifting of constraints
off of the dominant group in the creation of new federal pleading standards for
lawsuits, and in the areas of campaign financing, voting rights, and international
law; (3) psychological studies that reveal discriminatory behavior where there are
no legal constraints; (4) the exercise of the key state of nature virtues-force and
fraud-against Native Americans; (5) the existence of a state-of-nature-like
situation in the removal of Native Americans from certain areas of the United
States; (6) a state- of-nature-like existence outside of the American polity on the
part of African-Americans, Asian-Americans and Latinos; and (7) the connection

6 Owen J. Dwyer & John Paul Jones III, White Socio-Spatial Epistemology,

SOCIAL & CULTURAL
GEOGRAPHY 209, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2000, at 215 (the white majority believes that it is "insulate[d] ...
from a critical gaze" of racial minorities and "imagines it is altogether invisible to racialized
others"); David R. Roediger, Introduction, in BLACK ON WHITE: BLACK WRITERS ON WHAT IT
MEANS TO BE WHITE 6 (David R. Roediger ed., 1998) ("What bell hooks describes as the fantastic
white ability to imagine 'that black people cannot see them' constitutes a white illusion at once,
durable, powerful and fragile. It exists alongside a profound fear of actually being seen by people
of color").
' Martinez, supra note 3, at 806-833; see also Alan Ryan, Hobbes's Political Philosophy, in
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HOBBES 217-18 (Tom Sorrell ed., 1996) (the state of nature "is simply
the condition where we are forced into contact with each other in the absence of a superior
authority which can lay down and enforce rules to govern our behavior toward each other").
8

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 145 (Meridian Books 1969).
9 Edwin Curley, Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO

SPINOZA 316 (Don Garrett ed. 1996).
10 BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A Theological- Political Treatise and a Political Treatise, in WORKS OF
SPINOZA 292 (Dover Publications 1991) ("[T]he natural right of universal nature, and consequently
of every individual thing, extends so far as its power").
" Curley, supra note 9, at 327.
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between racial neoliberalism and the state of nature. In Part III, I argue that
acting as if in the state of nature has generated consciousness of guilt in the
dominant group. In part IV, I consider evidence regarding the relative health of
racial minorities, which suggests that racial minorities may be enduring a state of
nature existence. In Part V, I consider whether it is possible to escape from the
state of nature. Finally, in Part VI, I argue that state of nature theory is a way to
advance the multiracial paradigm shift in the area of race and law and that
scholars working in the area of race should follow the example of science and
seek patterns in the area of race and law.
H. THE STATE OF NATURE: AMORAL DECISION-MAKING, THE
LIFTING OF CONSTRAINTS ON THE MAJORITY AND TILE VIRTUES
OF FORCE AND FRAUD
A. Amoral Decision-making and Affirmative Action
The Supreme Court's recent decisions, in the context of affirmative
action, provide a powerful example of state-of-nature-like amoral decisionmaking as the dominant group deals with racial minorities. In the course of this
analysis, the term "Affirmative Action" will refer to:
A broad array of race-, ethnicity-, and gender-conscious
programs, enacted by the government and private sector,
voluntarily or by court order, to promote equality of opportunity
and racial diversity ....

It . .. includes programs that favor-

among similar candidates who satisfy necessary qualificationsmembers of historically underrepresented groups.12
One way to approach affirmative action from the perspective of morality
instead of the state of nature is to justify affirmative action on a theory of
corrective justicel3 that one has a moral duty to make amends for the damages
that racial minorities have sustained because of race discrimination - e.g., the

12 Gabriel Chin, Sumi Cho, Jerry Kang & Frank Wu, Beyond Self-Interest: Asian PacificAmericans
toward a Community of Justice: A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L. J.

129, 133 (1996).
" Tareq Al-Tawil, Does Restitutionfor Wrongdoing Give Effect to Primary or Secondary Rights?,
24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 243, 261 (2011) ("The idea of corrective justice received an early
formulation in Aristotle's treatment of justice.. .. For Aristotle, corrective justice is the theory of
the mean; more specifically, 'the just, or the equal, is the mean between the more and the less.'

Once it is established that the defendant has, as a result of his wrongful act, taken and acquired
more than he ought to have-that is, more than the mean-then he must surrender the surplus to the

claimant, who has less than the mean, or who has less than what he would have had, had the
defendant never acted wrongfully towards him").
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effects of slavery and Jim Crow.' 4 The Supreme Court's opinions have, however,
taken an amoral state-of-nature-like approach that seeks to justify affirmative
action on amoral grounds unconnected to corrective justice." Thus, in the
original Regents of the University of California v. Bakkel6 case, affirmative
action was justified, not on the basis of corrective justice, but on the ground that
it promoted "diversity."" Indeed, the Supreme Court in another leading case,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'8 saw affirmative action programs that were
based on corrective justice as "highly dangerous threats to the stability and peace
of our constitutional order."' 9 In the Supreme Court's most recent decision in
Grutter v. Bollinger,2 0 the Court continues to justify affirmative action on the

14 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking ConservativesSeriously: A Moral Justiyicationfor Affirmative Action
and Reparations,92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 708 (2004) ("If American society disrupted the racially just
distribution of black people's rights, resources and opportunities by discriminating on the basis of
race, then as a matter of corrective justice, society has a prima facie obligation to redress the
harmful effects of that discrimination"); see also Robert J. Delahunty, "ConstitutionalJustice" or
"ConstitutionalPeace"?: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11,
28 (2008); Kaimipono David Wenger, "Too Big to Remedy? ": Rethinking Mass Restitution for
Slavery and Jim Crow, 44 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 177, 197 (2010) ("Corrective justice ideas in
reparations are backward-looking and would require society to compensate for harms suffered by
Blacks"); Liav Orgad & Theodore Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in Immigration
Selection 120 Years after the Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 237, 241 (2010)
("From a moral perspective based on the principle of corrective justice, race can matter when it is
aimed at correcting past wrongs, a kind of reparation for past exploitation").
" Delahunty, supra note 14, at 37 (in its affirmative action decisions "the Court seemed to bypass
the debate over justice altogether, focusing instead on the instrumentalist question how affirmative
action policies, designed as a method of elite formation, could best serve the interests of the
nation"). See also Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action:
Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2004)
("Affirmative action is increasingly being justified not as a remedy to historical discrimination and
inequality, but as an instrumentally rational strategy used to achieve the positive effects of racial
and gender diversity in modem society").
16 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For analysis of Bakke, see generally Laurence H. Tribe, Perspectives on
Bakke: Equal Protection, ProceduralFairnessor StructuralJustice, 92 HARv. L. REv. 864 (1979);
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1745 (1996); Gabriel
J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 881
(1996).
17 Regents of the University of Calfornia,438 U.S. at 315-317 (1978) (With respect to affirmative,
action, "diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial and ethnic origin is but a single though important
element .... In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in
a particular applicant's file, yet does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other
candidates for the available seats. The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his
potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive . . ."); Delahunty, supra
note 14, at 43.
18 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
19 Delahunty, supra note 14, at 62.
20 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For analysis of Grutter, see generally Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on
Grutterand Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1589 (2003); Harry T. Edwards, The Journey
from Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity,
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amoral basis of diversity. 21 The Grutter Court, however, put a new spin on the
diversity justification. Diversity is necessary "[i]n order to cultivate a set of
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry." 22 This amoral justification
for affirmative action means that
The historic losses caused by slavery, Jim Crow and racial
segregation are left to lie where they fell. The condition of
African-Americans, other than those fortunate enough to be
selected into the nation's leadership ranks, is to be left
essentially undisturbed . . . ."
Grutter, thus, is a decision that is written from the amoral perspective of
the state of nature. Its amorality consists in "its utter indifference to the
normative demands of racial justice .... "24
What is the condition of racial minorities that is left undisturbed?
Sociologist Edwardo Bonilla-Silva has recently summarized the situation for
racial minorities in the United States as follows:
[R]acial considerations shade almost everything in
America. Blacks and dark-skinned racial minorities lag well
102 MICH. L. REv. 94 (2004); Rachel F. Moran, OfDoubt and Diversity: The Future ofAffirmative
Action in Higher Education, 67 0HIO ST. L. J. 201 (2006); Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead

End, 35 PEPP. L. REv. 705 (2008).
21 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body"). See also Bryan W. Leach, Race As Mission Critical: The
Occupational Need Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L. J. 1093
(2004) (Grutter held "that 'obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body' represents a compelling state interest").
22 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332; Delahunty, supra note 14, at 63-68. See also Leach, supra note 21, at
1094 (the Grutter Court "described the visible presence of minority lawyers in the upper echelons
of politics and the judiciary as crucial to the public's continued confidence in these institutions");
Angelique M. Davis, DescriptiveRepresentationMatters: The Connection between Access to Legal
Representationand Nonwhite Lawyer-Legislatorsin the United States, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J.
117, 118 (2012) ("The Grutter decision embraced democratic legitimacy as a justification for

student body diversity in law schools .

.

.. According to the Supreme Court, accessibility to law

school for every race and ethnicity is crucial to the legitimacy of our nation's leadership"). For
extensive analysis on how such "leaders" are to be developed in order to implement Grutter, see
generally Rebecca K. Lee, Implementing Grutter'sDiversity Rationale: Diversity and Empathy in
Leadership, 19 DuKE J. GENDER L & POL'Y 113 (2011).
23 Delahunty, supra note 14, at 68. See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking
Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 60, 69 (2004) ("the Court [in Grutter] has not embraced
their view that affirmative action can be justified as compensation for past societal discrimination.
The goal articulated in Grutter - integrating the leadership of major American institutions - does

not look back to catalogue all the multifold harms of slavery and Jim Crow, and offer a remedy.
Rather the opinion places us in the Here and Now, and looks to our national future").
24 Delahunty, supra note 14, at 70. See also Leach, supra note 21, at 1099 ("Indeed, occupational
need arguments risk diverting attention from the social justice claims that would otherwise
underpin the campaign for affirmative action").
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behind whites in virtually every area of social life; they are about
three times more likely to be poor than whites, earn about 40
percent less than whites, and have about an eighth of the net
worth that whites have. They also have an inferior education
compared to whites, even when they attend integrated
institutions. In terms of housing, black-owned units comparable
to white owned ones are valued at 35 percent less. Blacks and
Latinos also have less access to the entire housing market
because whites, through a variety of exclusionary practices by
white realtors and home owners, have been successful in
effectively limiting their entrance into many neighborhoods.
Blacks receive impolite treatment in stores, in restaurants, and in
a host of other commercial transactions. Researchers have also
documented that blacks pay more for goods such as cars and
houses than do whites. 'Finally, blacks and dark skinned Latinos
are the targets of racial profiling by police that, combined with
the highly racialized criminal court system, guarantees their
over-representation
among
those
arrested,
prosecuted,
incarcerated, and, if charged for a capital crime, executed. Racial
profiling on the highways has become such a prevalent
phenomenon that a term has emerged to describe it: driving
while black. In short, blacks and most minorities are 'at the
bottom of the well.' 2 5
B. The Lifting of Constraints off the Majority in the Creation of New
Federal Pleading Standards
One of the hallmarks of the state of nature is the absence or lifting of
legal constraints on the dominant group. 26 The U.S. Supreme Court has recently

25 EDUARDO

BONILLA-SILVA,

RACISM WITHOUT

RACISTS:

COLOR BLIND

RACISM AND

THE

PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2006). See also Mario Barnes,

Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L. J. 967, 983-992
(2010) (offering evidence showing that: (1) there is a high poverty rate for racial minorities; (2)
"the median net worth of white households is more than ten times that of black households;" (3)
"African-Americans and Latinos still disproportionately tend to occupy lower paying and lower
status jobs;" and (4) there is "unequal treatment within the U.S. criminal justice system"); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, The Obama Effect: Understanding Emerging Meanings of

"Obama" in Anti-discrimination Law, 87 IND. L. J. 325, 346 (2012) (showing that since the
election of President Barack Obama, "new and increased forms of racial discrimination" have been
created in the workplace); lan Haney Lopez, Post-racialRacism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarcerationin the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2010) (establishing that "[t]he

public security system in the United States.produces shocking racial disparities at every level, from
stops to arrests to prosecutions to sentencing to rates of incarceration and execution").
26 Martinez, supra note 3, at 826-833.
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lifted constraints off of the majority through an astonishing2 7 establishment of
new tough pleading standards for federal lawsuits, including civil rights and
employment discrimination cases. Since the middle of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court has had a fairly lenient standard for pleading a claim in federal
court: "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief."28 Recently, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,29
the Supreme Court held in the context of an antitrust lawsuit, that in order to
plead a claim in federal court one must allege "enough facts to state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.""o Subsequently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,3 the
Supreme Court held that this new heightened plausibility pleading standard
applies to all civil cases filed in federal court, including those that allege civil
rights or race discrimination violations.32 This tough new pleading standard is
expected to result in the dismissal of meritorious civil rights lawsuits, especially
lawsuits that allege racial discrimination. 3 3 Such dismissal is likely to result
because, among other things, judges may see race discrimination as something
relegated to the distant past and therefore claims of race discrimination will not
be seen as plausible. 34 In this regard, new studies show that these predictions and

The Court's decision was very surprising because "the Court replaced the prior [pleading
standard] with a new [pleading standard] and did so without utilizing the process created by the
Rules Enabling Act that calls for large scale consultative efforts, as well as substantial public
comment and feedback." Ronald J. Allen, Complexity, the Generation ofLegal Knowledge and the
Future ofLitigation, 60 U.C.LA. L. REV. 1384, 1391 (2013).
28 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
29 550 U.S. 544 (2007). For analysis of Twombly, see generally Robert G. Bone, Twombly,
Pleading Rules and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009); A. Benjamin
Spencer, PlausibilityPleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431 (2008); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with
Twombly: A ProposedPleading Standardfor Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1013; Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1851 (2008).
30 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
31 556 U.S. 662 (2009). For analysis of Iqbal, see generally Jordan D. Shepherd, When Sosa Meets
Iqbal: PlausibilityPleading in Human Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REv. 2318 (2011); Robert G.
Bone, PlausibilityPleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths about Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1337 (2010); David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy oflqbal, 99 GEo. L. J. 117 (2010).
32 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684.
13 Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Predismissal Discovery Can
Address the DetrimentalEffect of lqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 85106 (2010). See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Civil PretrialPractice: The
DisparateImpact on Civil Rights and Employment DiscriminationCases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517,
520 (2010) ("Empirical studies of the effect of Twombly and Iqbal suggest that these decisions have
resulted in the disproportionate dismissal of civil rights cases"); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of
Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 553, 555-56 (2010)
(finding a statistically significant increase in dismissals of civil rights cases in the wake of Iqbal).
34 Malveaux, supra note 33, at 93-94. See also Vicki Schultz & Stephen Fetterson, Race, Gender,
Work and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases
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fears are now being realized." These studies show that under the Iqbal
plausibility pleading regime: (1) "federal district courts have increased the
dismissal rate for Black plaintiffs' claims of race-based employment
discrimination: after Iqbal it is 2.66 times more likely that these claims will be
dismissed when challenged under Rule 8(a)" and (2) "Under Iqbal, federal
district courts increasingly dismissed Black pro se plaintiffs' claims of race
discrimination in the workplace: it is 2.10 times more likely that these clams will
be dismissed," and (3) there is "a robust trend in which White judges are
dismissing Black plaintiffs' claims of employment discrimination under Iqbal at
a higher rate (57.5%) than Black judges (33.3%).",36
In this regard, one of the main characteristics of the state of nature is the
exercise of unchecked power or the lack of constraint on one's actions.37 The
new federal pleading standard creates such a state of nature like situation in that
it creates an unchecked power on the part of judges to dismiss cases. In
determining whether a claim is "plausible," the court is "to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense." 38 As one commentator has explained, the use of
such vague terms as "plausibility" and "common sense" "clears a path for
unchecked judicial subjectivity to function as a major determinant of a lawsuit's
threshold viability." 39 The introduction of this unchecked power to dismiss cases
through this "subjective plausibility standard entrenches majority group
skepticism towards discrimination claims to the detriment of lawsuits brought by
members of minority groups, which can now be more readily dismissed."40 In
making it more difficult to bring race discrimination claims against the majority,
the Supreme Court has lifted a major legal constraint off of the majority as they
deal with minorities. This places minorities in a state-of-nature-like position with
respect to the dominant group.

ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073, 1180 (1992) ("After a decade of efforts to

enforce Title VII, federal judges apparently began to share the general public's belief that
employment discrimination against minorities had been largely eradicated").

Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social PsychologicalStudy of Iqbal's Effect
on Claims ofRace Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 36-38 (2011).
3 See Victor D.

Id. at 36-39.
Martinez, supra note 3, at 806-833.
38 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
39 Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal's Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism
36

37

Towards DiscriminationClaims, 114 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1443, 1450-1451 (2010).
40 Id. at 1481. See also Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to

Win?, 61 LA. L. REv. 555, 562-63 (2001) ("courts often analyze race cases from an anti-affirmative
action mindset, one that views both the persistence of discrimination and the merits of the
underlying claims with deep skepticism.. .. Moreover, it seems that the general consensus today is
that the role discrimination plays in contemporary America has been sharply diminished, and those
who take this view are reluctant to find discrimination. . .").
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C. Citizen's United, Campaign Financing and the Lifting of Legal
Constraints.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizen's United v. FEC,4 1
regarding campaign financing is consistent with state of nature theory in that it
operates to lift constraints off of the dominant group. In Citizens United, the
United States Supreme Court held that federal regulations prohibiting corporate
spending on elections were unconstitutional.42 The decision was extremely
controversial and apparently surprised many since for six decades it had been a
fundamental aspect of election law to bar such corporate spending.43 Critics see
the Citizens United decision as undermining equality by allowing "wealth to
dominate the operation of the political process.'
In this regard, Citizens United held that "corporations were persons
entitled to unlimited speech rights."45 For the Court, "the corporation merely was
a proxy for the persons behind it" and "thus held political personhood to function
for them,"4 6 The corporation, therefore, was "entitled [to] the full panoply of first
amendment rights in relation to spending in elections."47 Since corporations "are'
organized by, controlled by, and provide profits to a privileged group of ...
white men," the Citizens United decision has the effect of enabling white men "to
ensure their dominance over society through insuring them privilege through the
political process."48 Citizens United, then, lifts constraints off of the dominant

558 U.S. 310 (2010). For analysis of Citizens United, see generally Teneille R. Brown, In-Corpo-real: A Psychological Critique of Corporate Personhoodand Citizens United, 12 FLA. ST. U.
Bus. REV. 1 (2013); Zephyr Teachout, The Historical Roots of Citizens United v. FEC: How
Anarchists and Academics Accidentally Created Corporate Speech Rights, 5 HARv. L. & POL'Y
REV. 163 (2011); Jessica A. Levinson, We the Corporations?:The Constitutionalityof Limitations
on Corporate Electoral Speech after Citizens United, 46 U.S.F.L. REv. 307 (2011); Mark C.
Alexander, Citizens United and Equality Forgotten,35 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499 (2011);
Jarrod L. Schaeffer, The Incorporation of Democracy: Justice Kennedy's Philosophy of Political
Participationin Citizens United, 91 B.U.L REV. 1783 (2011).
42 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
4 See generally Michael S. Kang, The Campaign Finance Debate after Citizens United, 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1161 (2011).
' Gene Nichol, Citizens United and the Roberts Court's War on Democracy, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1007, 1013 (2011).
45 Atiba R. Ellis, Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 717, 743 (2011)
(emphasis added).
41

46
47

Id at 744.
1d

48 Id. See also Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity

Rationale, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 585, 597-600 (2011) (setting out statistics showing that "corporate
boards still reflect neither the demographics of the U.S. Population nor the demographics of the
labor force" and that there is a "predominance of white males on corporate boards"); William
Patton & Randall Bartlett, Corporate "Persons"and Freedom of Speech: The PoliticalImpact of
Legal Mythology, 1981 Wisc. L. REV. 494, 498 (1981) ("corporations as such do not speak or think
or have ideas. Corporate actions are the medium of expression of those natural persons who control
them"); Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O'Byrne, Can You Hear Me Now . . Good!: Feminisms and the
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group by providing white men with "an unfettered voice in the political market
place" which can be used to "dominate ordinary citizens." 49 This development
dramatically shifts "power away from communities of color."" Since racial and
ethnic minorities are set to "become the majority in this country" by the year
2050, Citizens United means that "by 2050, political, economic, and social power
may be concentrated in the hands of a minority of mostly white, mostly male
powerbrokers who may effectively be an oligarchy in relation to the majorityminority population of the United States." 5
This conclusion is consistent with Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid's
concerns expressed during the 2012 presidential campaign about the effect of
Citizen's United:
My concern is that ... 17 angry old white men are trying
to buy the election. And that's the truth . . . . They are literally
trying to buy the election.52
D. Shelby County v. Holder, Voting Rights and the Lifting of Legal
Constraints
One of the most controversial recent instances of the U.S. Supreme Court
lifting constraints off of the dominant group is its recent decision in Shelby
County v. Holder,53 striking down an important aspect of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in order to help enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition against race discrimination in the context of
voting.5 4 In particular, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires that certain
Public/PrivateDivide, and Citizens United v. FEC, 20 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L. J. 39, 60-61 (2013)
("corporate managers articulate their political views through the corporate vehicle they control. On
this basis, when the majority in Citizens United ignores the line between public and private by
admitting corporations as fully unregulated citizens, it is actually conferring a state created
mechanism for speaking on those individuals behind the corporation. Therefore the problem is not
merely that corporations do not speak. It is that, based on the majority's analysis, some people get

to speak twice-once as the individual speaking for himself and once as a corporate officer or
director speaking for the corporation").
4 Ellis, supra note 45, at 744 (emphasis added); Cohen & O'Byrne, supra note 48, at 65 ("the
corporate dominance created by Citizens United will affirm the relative power of historically
privileged white males over other groups"); Robin West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the

Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 713, 723 (2011) (observing that Citizens United by
"extending speech rights to corporations to influence political elections subordinates individual to
corporate interests").
5o

Ellis, supra note 45, at 748.

Id. at 749.
52 Nick Wing, Harry Reid, Worried about 'Karl Rove and 17 Angry Old White Men' Buying the
Election,
THE
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Oct.
30,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/30/harry-reid-karl-rove-white-men_n_2042900.html.
53 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
5" See Paul F. Hancock & Laura L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: An
Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URBAN LAWYER 379, 383-85 (1985) ("Congress determined
51
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jurisdictions secure preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice or the
federal district court in Washington D.C. of any changes in voting laws. 5 ' The
covered jurisdiction would have then to prove that such changes will not limit the
right to vote on the basis of race.5 1 In Shelby County, the Supreme Court struck
down as unconstitutional Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act which provides the
coverage formula for the preclearance requirement in Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. 7 The Court struck down the coverage formula in large part because
it was out of date inasmuch as it was based on forty-year-old data.5 ' The Court's
decision has been heavily criticized with some commentators expecting that with
the lifting of all legal constraints of the Voting Rights Act the jurisdictions that
had been covered "will once again engage in rampant racial discrimination
against voters of color."" These fears seem justified since in the wake of the
decision in Shelby County: "state officials across the South are aggressively
moving ahead with new laws requiring voters to show photo identification at the
polls," which is expected to make it more difficult for persons of color to vote.60
Shelby County has lifted constraints off the dominant group to the detriment of
racial minorities.
It is worth remembering that this is not the first time the United States
Supreme Court has lifted constraints off the majority to the detriment of the
voting rights of racial minorities. Following reconstruction in the late 1800s,
southern states sought to disenfranchise black voters by a number of devices,
including by imposing voter registration requirements such as literacy tests which
were intended to:
disproportionally disqualifLy] blacks even if applied fairly given
the higher rates of illiteracy among blacks. But nobody expected
registrars appointed by white supremacist Democrats to
impartially administer the tests.61

that stringent new remedies were required if racial discrimination was to be eliminated from the
electoral process. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 contains those remedies. The 1965 enactment
began with a provision to be applied nationwide, restating the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition
against racial discrimination in the electoral process, and followed with a 'complex scheme of
stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination had been most flagrant').
s See id at 386 (in order to make sure "that states and counties did not implement new methods of
racial discrimination in voting . . . Congress ... adopted the provision contained in section 5 of the
Act, requiring each targeted or 'covered' jurisdiction, if it wished to implement a voting standard,
practice or procedure" to secure approval from "the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia" or "the attorney general of the United States").

56 42 U.S.C. 1973, invalidatedby Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
57

See 133 S.Ct. at 2625-30.
" See Id. at 2628-29.
59 Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingence
Strategy, 123 YALE L. J. ONLINE 131, 131 (2013).
6o Michael Cooper, After Ruling States Rush to Enact Voter Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2013.
61 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
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These techniques were effective and black voter registration was
essentially ended by the early 1900s. 62 In any event, Southerners primarily sought
to nullify the voting rights of blacks by giving "discretion [to] local officials and
trust[ing] them to preserve white supremacy. "63
The United States Supreme Court aided this effort to undermine voting
rights by removing the constraints on the majority in the area of voting rights in
the 1898 case of Williams v. Mississippi' where an African-American challenged
the voting registration laws in Mississippi arguing that, among other things, the
literacy tests established by the laws gave local officials too much discretion to
deny African-Americans the right to vote. The Supreme Court held that the
Mississippi voting laws were constitutional, explaining that "[t]hey do not on
their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been shown that their
actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them." 5 This
ruling in effect lifted the constraints off of the majority and removed protection
from racial minorities in the area of voting rights.
E. The Effort to Lift the Constraint of International Law
State of nature theory holds that there is a tendency for the dominant
group to act without legal constraints or seek to move to a position with fewer
legal constraints as it deals with racial minorities.66 An important recent example
of this phenomenon is the effort of a number of states to ban the use of
international law in their courts.6 7 For instance, voters of the State of Oklahoma
have recently approved an amendment to the state's constitution, which mandates
that Oklahoma courts "shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations and
cultures" and "shall not consider international ... law." 68 That this may amount
to an effort to lift constraints off of the dominant group as it deals with minorities
may be seen in the case of Arizona. There is proposed legislation in Arizona
which would prohibit Arizona courts from relying on international law as either
"controlling or influential authority" in reaching decisions in lawsuits. 6 9
Significantly, this proposed law follows in the wake of United Nations human
rights experts warning in May 2010 that Arizona's new draconian immigration
STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 31 (2004).
62

Id. at 32.
1Id. at 33.

63

- 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
Williams, 170 U.S. at 225.

65

1 Martinez, supra note 3, at 806-833.
Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma State Question 755 and An Analysis of Anti-

67

InternationalLaw Initiatives, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY ISSUE BRIEF

(January 2011) (describing "initiative(s]

aimed at blocking consideration of foreign and

international law").
68 H.R.J. Res. 755, 52nd Leg. (Okla. 2010); Voters Ban Judges from Using International Law,

NEWS OK (Nov. 2, 2010), http://newsok.com/article/3510666 ("Oklahoma voters have approved a
measure that would forbid judges from considering international law ...
69 H. B. 2379,
4 9th Leg. (Ariz. 2010).

when deciding cases").
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which authorized racial profilingo of Latinos

and legislation outlawing ethnic studies programs in Arizona constitute "a
disturbing pattern of legislative activity hostile to ethnic minorities and
immigrants."7 The experts also pointed out that this system of laws may amount
to human rights violations under international law. 72 Given this context, the
proposed legislation barring the use of international law seems to be an effort to
lift the constraint of international law off of the majority and thereby remove
legal protection from Latinos and other minorities in Arizona. This lifting of the
constraint of international law is consistent with state of nature theory.
F. Psychological Studies and Discriminatory Behavior Where There Are No
Legal Constraints
In the state of nature, where there is an absence of legal constraints, I
have argued that there is too much temptation for the dominant group to do
wrong or bad things.7 3 Psychological literature provides evidence that where
there is a lack of legal constraint, members of the majority do act in
discriminatory ways toward members of minority groups.
Psychologists have recently determined that certain "implicit attitudes"
or racial stereotypes are spontaneously triggered when persons are in contact
with racial minorities.74 These attitudes may operate at an unconscious level.75
These implicit attitudes generate discriminatory behavior in interracial contexts.76
For instance, whites with higher implicit prejudice will engage in less nonverbal

See Gabriel J. Chin et al, A Legal Labyrinth:Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 47, 66-67 (2010) (explaining that Senate Bill 1070 authorizes racial profiling).
71 Independent U.N. Rights Experts Speak Out against Arizona Immigration Law, U.N. NEWS
SERVICE (May 11, 2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID-34663#.V5VcO2NIn-Z.
72 Id.
7

Martinez, supra note 3, at 833-37.

74 Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, FairMeasures: A BehavioralRealist Revision of "Affirmative

Action ", 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1083-84 (2006) ("when we see a Black (or a White) person, the
attitudes and stereotypes associated with that racial category automatically activate"); Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499 (2005) ("Once a person is assigned to a
racial category, implicit and explicit racial meanings associated with that category are triggered").
1 Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 74, at 1505-06 (racial schemas "operate
automatically-without conscious intention and outside of our awareness").
76 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 972 (2006)
("those who demonstrate implicit bias also manifest this bias in various forms of actual behavior").
The damaging effects of racial stereotypes have been recognized for some time in law. For
instance, Professor Louis Lusky argued in 1963 that the purpose of the segregation of blacks was to
preserve the stereotype that blacks were fundamentally different from whites and somehow less
than human. See Louis Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard Core of Racism, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 450, 451-52
(1963-64) ("segregation's significant function is not to deliver an insult but to preserve the group
stereotype by minimizing contact between the races in situations where they would necessarily see
and deal with each other as individuals, and by putting the official imprimatur on the reposition that
Negros and Whites differ in a legally material way").
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friendliness - e.g., less smiling or eye contact when interacting with blacks."
Such "[i]nterpersonal discrimination" is not forbidden by law." As a result, the
dominant group has unchecked power to engage and will likely be inclined to
engage in such discriminatory behavior.
G. The State of Nature Virtues of Force and Fraud
According to Thomas Hobbes, the key virtues that are practiced in the
state of nature are force and fraud.79 The dominant group appears to have
exercised something like these "virtues" against Native Americans.
Consider the use of something like deceptive tactics and force against
Native Americans in the acquisition of tribal lands. First, as to the use of fraud, it
is now recognized that "the United States consciously engaged in 'ruse,
subterfuge, circumvention, and outright fraud to achieve through chicanery,
under the cloak of voluntary cooperation, a continued stream of land cessions'
from Native Americans.o For instance, the representatives of the United States
who negotiated the treaties that ceded Indian land to the United States "secured
fraudulent advantage by dulling Indian wits with alcohol" and by providing
"[d]eliberately faulty translations of treaty texts and inaccurate explanations of
treaty terms to Indian tribes possessed of limited language skills."i Similarly,
with respect to the use of force, in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,8 2 the
Supreme Court explained that the Indian tribes typically were stripped of their
lands through the use of conquering force:
Every American schoolboy knows the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force, and
that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in

n John Dovidio, Samuel L. Gaertner, Kerry Kawakami & Gordon Hodson, Why Can't We Just Get
Along? InterpersonalBiases andInterracialDistrust, CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND ETHNIC MINORITY

PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 8, No. 2, 88, 95 (2002).
78 Michelle R. Hebl, Jessica Bigazzi Foster, Laura Mannix & John Dovidio, Formal and
InterpersonalDiscrimination:A FieldStudy of Bias toward Homosexual Applicants, PERSONALITY
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, Vol. 28, No. 6, 815, 816 (2002).
7 HOBBES, supra note 8, at 145.

so Eric Kades, The Dark Side ofEfficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the ExpropriationofAmerican
Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1124 (2000) (quoting MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POLITICS OF
INDIAN REMOVAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 50 (1982)); see also William Bradford,

"With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliationand an American Indian
Plea to Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2002-2003) ("In sum, many, if not all,
of the Indian treaties ceding land to the United States are physical embodiments of the fraud,
unconscionability, and duress governing their drafting").
81 Bradford, With a Very GreatBlame, supra note 80, at 27-29.
82 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the
conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.83
Perhaps not surprisingly, and in light of the history of the exercise of
state of nature virtues, Thomas Jefferson seems to have viewed Native
Americans as though in the state of nature when he wrote:
Let a philosophic observer commence a journey from the
savages of the Rocky Mountains, eastwardly towards our seacoast. There he would observe in the earliest stage of association
living under no law but that of nature, subsisting and covering
themselves with flesh and skins of wild beasts.84
H. Indian Removal, the State of Nature, and War
In the early 1800s, there was an effort-which clearly reveals a state of
nature-like situation for Native Americans-to remove Native Americans from
certain areas in the American south. In the state of Georgia, the legislature
enacted a series of laws designed to impose hardships on the Cherokee Indian
Tribe so that they would give up their lands and leave the state of Georgia. 6 In
order to prevent Native Americans from challenging the validity of these statutes,
laws were enacted to bar Native Americans from using the courts. 87 Among other

Id at 289-90; see also Ann E. Tweedy, "HostileIndian Tribes . .. Outlaws, Wolves, . . . Bears . .
Grizzlies and Things Like That?" How the Second Amendment and Supreme Court Precedent
Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 687, 721-22 (2011).
84 RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 48 (2008)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Ludlow (September 6, 1824), in WRITINGS OF
JEFFERSON VOL. 16 74-75 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1904)). Interestingly,
Jefferson developed a plan, that was detailed in a "Confidential Message" to Congress, to secure
lands from Native Americans. Id. at 46-47. According to this plan, Native Americans could be
induced to sell their land by encouraging them to become farmers and give up their hunting mode
of living and by seeking to make them debtors who could settle large debts only by selling their
lands. Id at 47.
5 See Kathleen Sands, Territory, Wilderness, Property and Reservation: Land and Religion in
Native American Supreme Court Cases, 36 AM INDIAN L. REV. 253, 271 (2012) (describing "a
policy that the federal government began to push vigorously in the 1820s: the voluntary removal of
all eastern Indians from the area west of the Mississippi River").
86 See id at 271 ("By the late 1820s, Georgia was aggrieved with the federal government for failing
to secure the Cherokees' voluntary emigration . . . It was in this context that Georgia had set about
dissolving the Cherokee Nation through its own legislative measures"); Gerald N. Magliocca, The
Cherokee Removal and the FourteenthAmendment, 53 DUKE L. J. 875, 885 (2003) ("Over the next
few years, [the Georgia Legislature] passed a series of measures aimed at forcing the Cherokees to
accept second-class status or leave the state").
87 See WALTER R. ECHOHAWK, THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE WORST INDIAN LAW CASES
EVER DECIDED 95-96 (2010).
83
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things, these statutes outlawed contracts between Native Americans and white
people, set up a lottery to allow whites to acquire Native American lands,
confiscated Native American gold and silver mines, nullified Native American
laws, and directed the Georgia governor to request the American President to
remove the Native Americans from the state." The Cherokee Tribe sought to
challenge these laws in the U.S. Supreme Court in a case styled Cherokee Nation
89 The Supreme Court
v. Georgia.
held that the Cherokee Tribe could not proceed
in federal court because it was not a foreign nation and only a foreign nation
could sue a state under the Eleventh Amendment, which protects the state's
sovereign immunity from suit. 90 The Court explained:
The Court has bestowed its best attention to this question, and
after mature deliberation, the majority is of the opinion that an
Indian tribe or Nation within the United States is not a foreign
state in the sense of the Constitution, and cannot maintain an
action in the courts of the United States.9 1
In addition, the Supreme Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the matter of Cherokee self-government and the protection of land with
respect to the state of Georgia because there were political questions not
susceptible to resolution by the courts. 92 The Court explained:
The bill requires us to control the Legislature of Georgia, and to
restrain the exertion of its physical force. The propriety of such
an interposition by the Court may be well questioned. It savors
too much of the exercise of political power to be within the
proper province of the judicial department . . . If it be true that
the Cherokee Nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which
those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been
inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not
the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future.93
In a separate opinion, Justice Johnson further explained that this case
raised non-justiciable political questions because a state-of-nature-like situation
of war94 existed between the Cherokee Tribe and the State of Georgia:

See Magliocca, supra note 86, at 885; Echohawk, supra note 87, at 96-98.
30 U.S. 1 (1831).
90 See id. at 20.
89

9' Id..
92

Id..

93 Id.

' See HOBBES, supra note 8, at 143 (in the state of nature, people live in a "condition which is
called war, and such a war, is of every man, against every man").
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What does this series of allegations exhibit but a state of war
and the fact of invasion? They allege themselves to be a
sovereign independent state, and set out that another
sovereign state has, by its laws, its functionaries, and its
armed force, invaded their State and put down their
authority. This is war in fact; though not being declared with
the usual solemnities, it may perhaps be called war in
disguise. And the contest is distinctly a contest for empire. It
is not a case of meum and tuum in the judicial, but in the
political sense. Not an appeal to laws, but to force. A case in
which a sovereign undertakes to assert his right upon his
sovereign responsibility; to right himself, and not appeal to
any arbiter but the sword, for the justice of his cause . . . . In
the exercise of sovereign right, the sovereign is the sole
arbiter of his own justice."

-

In not allowing the Cherokee Tribe access to the courts to challenge
these anti-Native American laws, the Supreme Court lifted the constraint of any'
law on the dominant group and exposed the Cherokees to state-of-nature-likecondition of war, where notions of justice or morality were not applicable.
Instead, the state of nature "virtue" of force was applied to the Cherokee Tribe.
More generally, this "virtue" of force was brutally applied to Native
Americans in the course of this state-of-nature-like situation of war. William
Bradford explains:
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the might of the U.S. Army
was directed toward Indian eradication. Military and civilian
contractors induced deliberate starvation by destroying primary
food sources such as the buffalo, yet Indian tenacity necessitated
more direct application of force. One by one, the Seminole, the
Nez Perce, Lakota, Shoshone, Comanche, Apache and other
tribes were hunted, pursued, cornered and murdered. A series of
"massacres" were written in Indian blood on the pages of
American history .

. .

. By the conclusion of the Indian wars in

1890, the pre-Columbian Indian population was reduced [by] as
much [as] 98%, and an IndianreinUnited States was not beyond
possibility. 96

9 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 29 (Johnson, B., dissenting).
96 William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliationand
an American Indian Plea to Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2002-2003).
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I. The State of Nature, Malcolm X, the Permanent Foreignness of AsianAmericans and Latinos, and Existence Outside of the American Polity

J.
State of Nature theory explains some interesting and puzzling remarks by
the black American civil rights leader Malcolm X." In his famous "The Ballot or
the Bullets" speech, Malcolm X speaks "as an outsider to the [American]
polity."" Indeed, he states that he did not self-identify as an American.99 What
explains these puzzling remarks? I suggest that he is speaking as someone in the
state of nature-i.e., as a member of a group of black Americans who are
unprotected by law from the majority and, therefore, existing in a state-of-naturelike situation somewhere outside of the American polity or state. 00 In this
regard, he criticizes the Democrats for their failure to enact legal protection for
blacks, pointing out that, although the Democrats were the majority in both
houses of Congress and held the presidency of the United States, they refused to
pass and enact civil rights legislation to protect African-Americans."' Thus, as
people who were unprotected by law, he states that they are not truly Americans
but just "Africans who are in America."' 02 Accordingly, Malcolm X asserts that,
as long as blacks are unprotected by law, they should engage in self-defense.' 03
A parallel situation of a people in a state-of-nature-like position existing
somewhere outside of America seems to arise in the context of Asian Americans.
Asian Americans have been legally and socially constructed as unassimilated
"permanent foreigners" existing "outside the American citizenry."1 04 The case
law is instructive on this point. For instance, in People v. Hall,os in holding that
the testimony of a Chinese person was inadmissible to convict a white person, the
California Supreme Court described the Chinese living in California as being
unable to assimilate into mainstream America and instead constituting:
a distinct people, living in our community, recognizing no laws
of this State except through necessity, bringing with them their
prejudices and national feuds, in which they indulge in open
violation of law; whose mendacity is proverbial; a race of people

97 For recent work on Malcolm X, see generally John M. Kang, Martin v. Malcolm: Democracy,
Non-violence, Manhood, 114 W. VA. L. REv. 937 (2012); Ali Khan, Lessons from Malcolm X:
Freedom by Any Means Necessary, 38 How. L. 1. 79 (1944).
93 Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Guns and Membership in the American Polity, 21 WM. & MARY BILL

RTS. J. 619, 630, 632 (2012).
99 MALCOLM LITTLE, MALCOLM X SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 25 (George

Breitman, ed., 1965).
100

See id. at 26.

101 See id. at 27.

102 Id. at 36.
103 Id. at 43.
"0 Neil Gotanda, The Racialization of Islam in American Law, 637 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 184, 190 (2011).
10

4 Cal. 399 (1854).
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whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of
progress and intellectual development beyond a certain point as
their history has shown, differing in language, opinions, color,
and physical conformation; between whom and ourselves nature
has placed an impassable difference .... 1 06
Similarly, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,10 7 the U.S. Supreme Court
observed that the Chinese living in the United States are "of a distinct race and
religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves,
tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar
with our institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our
people.""os As Neil Gotanda has explained, these cases show that the Chinese
living in America "are and will forever be marked by a permanent taint of
'foreignness"'

. . .

and are not included "within American law and American

life."l 09
Likewise, Latinos are also perceived as foreign and apparently existing
somewhere outside of the American polity because they are seen as unable to.
assimilate into the dominant Anglo-American culture.110 Indeed, because Latinos
are allegedly unable to assimilate, they supposedly constitute a threat to the
"cultural and political integrity of the United States."'
This phenomenon of placing Asian Americans and Latinos outside of the
American polity has recently intensified with efforts by state and local.
governments to regulate immigration. For example, the state of Arizona has
enacted draconian anti-immigrant legislation that provides, among other things,
that state officials are to "make a reasonable attempt to determine the
immigration status of a person stopped, detained or arrested if there is a.
reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully present in the United
States."" 2 The language of this Arizona statute authorizes the racial profiling of
Latinos and Asians, including American citizens and undocumented persons."'
This is because "[t]he Arizona law as drafted permits the consideration of race to
106

1d at 404-05; Gotanda, RacializationofIslam, supra note 104, at 190.

U.S. 698 (1893).
Id; Gotanda, Racialization ofIslam, supra note 104, at 190.
109 Gotanda, The Racializationoflslam, supra note 104, at 190.
1o See Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV.
LATINO L. REv. 101, 117 (1997) ("An important commonality of the Latino experience in the
United States is that dominant society views Latinos, and the differences that they bring, as
something foreign to the Anglo-Saxon core"); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE
CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 222 (2004) ("Mexican immigrants and their
progeny have not assimilated into American society as other immigrants did in the past and as
many other immigrants are doing now").
HUNTINGTON, supra note 110, at 243.
112 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Ariz. 2010).
1"3 See Gabriel J. Chin et al, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 47, 66-67 (2010).
107149
108
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the extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution, which as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, sanctions the consideration of race as a relevant factor in
immigration enforcement . . [or] in making an immigration stop... ."ll4 Asian
Americans and Latinos will be subject to such racial profiling in this immigration
enforcement context because they suffer from "a recurrent form of racism" which
"identiffies] the Other Non-White [e.g., Asian-Americans and Latinos] as
possessing a dimension of 'foreignness' and "this foreignness translates into
racially discriminatory treatment for Other Non-Whites [e.g., Asian-Americans
and Latinos] under the guise of disparate treatment of non-citizens.""' Under
these circumstances, these anti-immigrant efforts may be seen as attempts to
build community by "banding together against the 'other."'116 As a result, these
efforts place Asian-Americans and Latinos in a state-of-nature-like situation
somewhere outside of America inasmuch as they "do not include 'Other NonWhites in their vision of political community. "117
K. Racial Neoliberalism and the State of Nature.
The project of "racial neoliberalism" has arisen in recent years and seeks
to construct a world where "race" is no longer viewed "as a legitimate topic or
term of public discourse or public policy.""' According to this racial neoliberal
project, the notions of racism or discourse on race are outmoded ideas and no
longer relevant to contemporary society."' Indeed, this program "seeks to wipe
out the terms of reference, to wipe away the very vocabulary necessary to recall

114 Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The Racially Disparate Impacts of
Arizona's S.B. 1070 and the Failureof Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 U. C. IRVINE L. REV.
313, 332 (2012).
1" Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community among "We the
People," 76 OREGON L. REV. 233, 252-53 (1997).
116
Id. at 258.
"17 Id.
"I Darrel Enck-Wanzer, Barack Obama, the Tea Party, and the Threat of Race: Or Racial
Neoliberalism and Born Again Racism, 4 COMMUNICATION, CULTURE & CRITIQUE 23-24 (2001).
See also David J. Roberts & Minelle Mahtani, Neoliberalizing Race, Racing Neoliberalism:
Placing "Race" in Neoliberal Discourses, 42 ANTIPODE, no. 2, 2010, at 248, 253 ("claims of
racism under neoliberalism are fundamentally ruled as outside of the way in which society . . . is
structured").
"19 Enck-Wanzer, Barack Obama, supra note 118, at 25; Roberts & Mahtani, supra note 118, at
254 ("Neoliberalist policy is sneaky because it can force the hand of apparent race-blindness by
insisting that race does not play an important role"); Henry A. Giroux, Spectacles of Race and
Pedagogies of Denial: Anti-Black Racist Pedagogy under the Reign of Neoliberalism, 52(3-4)
COMMUNICATION EDUCATION 191-211 (2003) ("Neoliberal racism asserts the insignificance of race
as social force, and it aggressively roots out any vestige of race as a category at odds with an
individualistic embrace of formal legal rights"); cf Anthony V. Alfieri, Post-racialismin the Inner
City: Structure and Culture in Lawyering, 98 GEO. L. J. 921, 923 (2010) ("many in politics and in
the media proclaim the end of race, engendering a new orthodoxy of colorblind neutrality in
popular discourse on racial equality").
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and recollect, to make a case, to make a claim" of racism or racial discrimination
or racial justice. 1 20 In this context, any effort to construct a societal critique on the
basis of a demand for racial justice is "met with resistance, ridicule and
reactionary politics."l 2' This project denies that racism exists and explains any
apparent inequalities among the races as generated through the fault of racial
minorities and holds that any attempt by the state to remedy or correct racial
inequalities constitutes racism. 122 Obviously, to the extent that this neoliberal
project is successful, and minorities are deprived of the ability to make claims for
racial justice in law or elsewhere in society, constraints are lifted off of the
majority and minorities are relegated to the state of nature.
We can observe the effort to redefine attempts to remedy racial
inequality as racism in recent Supreme Court cases. For instance, in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 1,123 the Seattle and
Louisville School districts developed voluntary racial integration programs. The
Supreme Court held that these integration schemes were unconstitutional under
the 14 th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.1 24 The plans had been
constructed to reduce segregation and create a "racially integrated
environment." 25 A plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that this effort to
remedy racial inequality through integration is unconstitutional: "In design and
operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance pure and simple, an
objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate." 26 Indeed, "the
plurality's approach lends credence to the idea that integration itself may be a

120 DAVID T. GOLDBERG, THE THREAT OF RACE: REFLECTIONS ON RACIAL NEOLIBERALISM 21

(2009). See also Dana-Ain Davis, Narratingthe Mute: Racializing and Racism in a Neoliberal
Moment, 9(4) SOULS 346-360 (2007) ("Under neoliberal racism the relevance of the raced subject,
racial identity and racism is subsumed under the auspices of meritocracy. For in a neoliberal
society, individuals are supposedly freed from identity and operate under the limiting assumptions
that hard work will be rewarded if the game is played according to the rules. Consequently, any
impediments to success are attributed to personal flaws. This attribution affirms notions of
neutrality and silences claims of racializing and racism").
121
Enck-Wanzer, Barack Obama, supra note 118, at 25.
12 2
ANDREW BARLOW, BETWEEN FEAR AND HOPE: GLOBALIZATION AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES

8 (2003). See also HENRY GIROux, AGAINST THE TERROR OF NEOLBERALISM 65, 71 (2008)

(According to the neoliberal framework, racism is eliminated because "success is attributed to . .
entrepreneurial genius while those who do not succeed are viewed as failures or utterly expendable
... neoliberal racism either dismisses the concept of institutional racism or maintains that it has no
merit").
123 551 U.S. 701 (2007). For analysis of Parents Involved, see generally Pamela S. Karlan, What
Can Brown Do for You? Neutral Principlesand the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58
DuKE L. J. 1049 (2009); Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality and Liberty: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Parents Involved, 69 OHIo ST. L. J. 1321 (2008); Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2007).
124 ParentsInvolved in Community Schools, 551 U.S. at 733-35.
125 Id. at 725.
126 Id at 726; Michelle Adams, Is Integrationa DiscriminatoryPurpose?, 96 IOWA L. REv. 837,
851 (2011).
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discriminatory purpose . . . and raises profound doubts that integration is an

.

objective the government should pursue. It is an insignificant step toward
destabilizing the concept of 'discrimination. "'127 Integration was supposed to
generate social equality and remedy racial inequalities.' 28 However, "if
integration equals discrimination, then all governmental integration efforts . .
are suspect and potentially even unconstitutional."1 29 In Parents Involved, then,
we observe the neoliberal project in the process of redefining "discrimination" so
that efforts to remedy racial inequalities through integration are unconstitutional
acts of racial discrimination.
This neoliberal redefinition of "discrimination" and other racial terms
and the general racial neoliberal project also reflects the shift taking place in our
country where the United States is changing from a nation state into a neoliberal
market state. According to Philip Bobbitt, the constitutional order of the United
States is transforming from a nation state into a market state.130 The fundamental
rationale of the nation state is to improve the material well-being of the people
whereas the market state is based on expanding or maximizing the opportunities
to be offered to the public.' 1 To accommodate this shift, the U.S. Supreme Court
is currently reconstructing constitutional law.' 3 2 One of the consequences of this
shift is that the Supreme Court no longer views the assimilation or integration of
racial minorities into mainstream American society as a fundamental objective.13
According to this account, the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Bd. Of
Education,'34 which overturned legislatively mandated segregation in public
schools, represents the Supreme Court's establishment of a policy to integrate or
assimilate racial minorities into American society-a policy the Supreme Court
developed in order to respond to cold war international concerns-in particular,
to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting issues of race as the Soviet Union

127 Adams, Is Integrationa DiscriminatoryPurpose, supra note 126, at 853.
128

Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REv. 261, 271-72 (2006) ("[T]he integration

vision most closely associated with the Civil Rights Movement had three primary characteristics:
(i) the belief that 'assimilation would eventually cure racial bigotry,' (ii) the expectation that race
mixing under conditions of social equality would break down racial stereotypes and allow members

of each group to appreciate a common, shared humanity, and (iii) the belief that integration would
eradicate the advantages that whites had accrued through segregation").
129 Adams, Is Integrationa DiscriminatoryPurpose, supra note 126, at 865.
130 PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 228

(2002). For analysis of Bobbitt's theory, see generally Ar Afilalo & Dennis Patterson, Statecraft,
Trade and the Order ofStates, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 725 (2006); Robert J. Delahunty & Antonio Perez,
Moral Communities or a Market State: The Supreme Court's Vision of Police Power in the Age of
Globalization, 42 Hous. L. REv. 637 (2005); Ron Sievert, A New Perspective on the International
CriminalCourt: Why the Right Should Embrace the ICC andHow America Can Use It, 68 U. PiTT.
L. REv. 77 (2006); Lindsay J. Thompson, The Future of Enterprise Regulation: Corporate Social
Accountability and Human Freedom, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 357 (2008).
131 BOBBITT, SHIELD OF ACHILLES, supra note 130, at xxvi.
132 Delahunty & Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State, supra note 130, at 643.
3 Id. at 703-04.
I34

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and the United States competed for influence at home and abroad.' In the wake
of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States is now moving away
from the goal of integrating or assimilating racial minorities.'3 6 Given this
background, the redefinition of "discrimination" in the Parents Involved case to
view racial integration as unconstitutional is consistent with this ongoing shift in
constitutional law and constitutional order-a shift that does not view the
integration of racial minorities as an important or necessary goal.
This shift away from integrationism is a radical change. At one time,
integration was seen as an anti-racist world view which was to challenge racism
wherever it appeared in society.1' Indeed, as Gary Peller has explained:
[T]he idea of racial integration represented a powerful,
spiritually-rooted social resistance movement that threatened to
destabilize the status quo of American institutional life in
profound ways. Under the banner of integrationism, hundreds of
thousands of people mobilized to challenge the political,
economic, and cultural power relations in cities and towns across
the country, employing tactics that included mass protest,
economic boycotts, civil disobedience, sit-ins and strikes.'
III. THE STATE OF NATURE: SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND GUILT
In my State of Nature article, I argued that acting as if in the state of
nature with respect to minorities-i.e., with great power or lack of constraintwould lead to bad consequences for the dominant group, including knowledge of

13 Delahunty & Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State, supra note 130, at 703. See also
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93

HARV. L. REv. 518, 524-25 (1980); Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress:
A "Social Healing through Justice" Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu
Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L. J. 5, 41 (2009) ("historically, harsh international
criticism of America's racist Jim Crow democracy during the Cold War compelled United States
political leaders to shift positions and argue for ending the separate-but-equal doctrine in Brown v.
Board of Education"); Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African-American
Fortunes-InterestConvergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 369, 371
(2002) ("gains for blacks coincide with white self-interest and materialize at times when elite
groups need a breakthrough for African-Americans usually for the sake of world appearances or the
imperatives of international competition").
16 Delahunty & Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State, supra note 130, at 703-704; cf Gary
Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L. J. 758, 767 (recognizing that the ideal of integrationism
was "not inevitable or self-evident, but rather is situated within the confines of a particular set of
social, cultural, and philosophical assumptions about the world").
137 See Peller, supra note 136, at 769 ("The solution to segregation, then is integration, understood
as a social vision opposed to racism, in each realm in which racism manifests itself").
" Peller, supra note 136, at 767.
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their own wrongdoing and consciousness of guilt.' 3 9 This state of affairs has
come about. Consider some important examples that illustrate this phenomenon.
Thomas Jefferson, one of the founders of the American Republic and the
third President of the United States, acknowledged that the racism of whites in
establishing the institution of slavery and taking away the liberty of African
Americans deserved just punishment from God. Jefferson wrote:
And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of
people that these liberties are of the gift of God? That they are
not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I tremble for my
country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot
sleep for ever; that considering numbers, nature and natural
means only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of
situation is among possible events; that it may become probable
by supernatural interference! The Almighty has no attribute
which can take side with us in such a contest.1 4 0
Other members of the American founding generation also believed that
slavery would draw down a divine wrath on America.14' For instance, Luther
Martin stated at the Maryland Constitutional Convention that "the continuance of
the slave trade ... ought to be considered as justly exposing us to the displeasure
and vengeance of him, who is equally Lord of all, and who views with equal eye
the poor African slave and his American master." 42
Similarly, President Abraham Lincoln saw the American civil war as
punishment from God for slavery in the United States. We see this in Lincoln's
second inaugural address:
One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not
distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the
southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and
powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the

139 See Martinez, supra note 3, at 834-37.
140 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 403-04 (H.A.

Washington ed., New York, Derby & Jackson 1859). See also Samuel W. Calhoun, May the
PresidentAppropriatelyInvoke God? Evaluating the Embryonic Stem Cell Votes, 10 RUTGERS J. L.

& RELIGION 1, 15 (2008) ("Jefferson later gave equally irrefutable evidence that his condemnation
of slavery was premised in his religious beliefs. He feared the wrath of God against the country on
account of slavery").
141 Sandra L. Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765,

776 (2011).
142 Id. at 776-77 (quoting Remarks of Luther Martin and the Maryland ConstitutionalConvention
(Nov. 29, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 172, 211 (Max

Farrand ed., 1966).
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cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this
interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the
Union even by war; while the government claimed no right to do
more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither
party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it
has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the
conflict might cease with, or even before the conflict itself
should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less
fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray
to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It
may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's
assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's
faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of
both could not be answered. That of neither has been answered
fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. "Woe unto the world
because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but
woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall
suppose that American Slavery is one of those offenses which, in
the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having
continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove,
and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the
woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern
therein any departure from those divine attributes which the
believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we
hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may
speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the
wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of
unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood
drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the
sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be
said "the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous
altogether." 43
Beyond this, the famous footnote fourl 44 of the US. v. Carolene
Productsl45 case seems to imply that the dominant group is conscious of its guilt

143 RONALD C. WHITE JR., LINCOLN'S GREATEST SPEECH: THE SECOND INAUGURAL 718-19 (2002).
See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 254 (1996) (describing Lincoln's Second Inaugural
as a "prophetic (Old Testament) interpretation of the Civil War as God's punishment for the sin of

slavery").
144 Justice Lewis Powell has described this footnote four as "the most celebrated footnote in
constitutional law." Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087
(1982). See generally Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of

Minorities, 91 YALE L. J. 1287 (1982) ("Each constitutional generation organizes itself about
paradigmatic events and texts. For my generation, it is clear that these events are Brown v. Board of
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with respect to its treatment of minorities. The footnote seems to recognize that
there is a tendency for the majority to treat minorities in racist ways. The
Supreme Court suggested that legislation directed at racial minorities should not
be entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and instead should receive very
careful judicial scrutiny because "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry."1 4 6
IV. THE HEALTH OF RACIAL MINORITIES AND THE STATE OF
NATURE
According to Thomas Hobbes, in the state of nature life is "nasty, brutish
and short." 47 The evidence regarding the relative health of racial minorities
raises a question as to whether minorities are enduring a state of nature existence.
For instance, in 2004, blacks had a shorter life expectancy than whites: 73.1 years
as compared to 78.3 years.1 4 8 Indeed, both blacks and Native-Americans "have a
consistent pattern of elevated mortality risk compared to whites."l 4 9 Blacks are
twenty times more likely than whites to experience heart failure before age 50.150
Education and the civil rights movement and that the text is footnote four. For whether or not the
footnote is a wholly coherent theory, it captures the constitutional experience of the period from
1954 to 1964. And that experience, more than the logic of any theory, is the validating force in
law").
45
1 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
146 Carolene Products, supra note 80, at 152 n. 4. Justice Lewis Powell describes the theory
expressed in footnote four as follows:
The fundamental character of our government is democratic. Our constitution
assumes that majorities should rule and that the government should be able to
govern. Therefore, for the most part, Congress and state legislatures should be
allowed to do as they choose. But there are certain groups that cannot
participate effectively in the political process. And the political process
therefore cannot be trusted to protect these groups in the way that it protects
most of us. Consistent with these premises .

.

. the Supreme Court .

.

. [must]

review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to discrete and insular
minorities who are unable to protect themselves in the legislative process.
Powell, supra note 144, at 1088-89.
147 HOBBES, supra note 8, at 143.
148 David R. Williams et al, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: Complexities, Ongoing
Challenges, and Research Opportunities, ANN. N.Y. AcAD. SCi. 1186, pp. 69-101, 70 (2010).
[hereinafter Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health]. See also Vernellia R. Randall, Eliminating
Racial Discriminationin Healthcare:A Call for State Health Care Anti-Discrimination Law, 10
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 2 (2006) ("Racial minorities are sicker than white Americans; they
are dying at a significantly higher rate").
149 Williams, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health, supra note 148, at 71.
10
s Id at 72.
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Blacks experience hypertension or high blood pressure at a younger age than
whites.i' In addition, as compared to whites, "African-Americans are less likely
to receive analgesics for pain, cardiac medications, surgery for early-stage lung
cancer, treatment for glaucoma, and referral for cardiac catheterizations. "152
Some of the bad health consequences would seem to be traceable to state
of nature like behavior. Arab-Americans experienced hostile attacks following
These attacks seem to be based on their foreign
the tragic events of 9/11
appearance, which seems to trigger the harshness of the state of nature. 5 4 This
harsh post 9/11 environment seems to have generated stress for Arab-Americans
resulting in bad health consequences."'5 In particular, in the six months following
9/11, Arab-American women in California experienced an "increased risk of low
birth weight and pre-term birth compared with similar women who gave birth a
year earlier." 56
In addition, Native Americans have suffered deprivations of human
rights as the dominant group has exercised its state of nature like unchecked
plenary power against them."' It is now understood that such "historical trauma".
has negatively impacted the health of Native Americans."' "Historical trauma" is

151

Id. at 72.

152 Mary L. Fennell, et al, Facility Effects on Racial Differences in NursingHome Quality of Care,

15 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 174, 175 (2000). See also Dania Palanker, Enslaved by Pain: How the
US. PublicHealth System Adds to Disparitiesin Pain Treatmentfor African Americans, 15 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 847, 851 (2008) ("Numerous studies show that African Americans receive
less analgesics and other pain treatment than whites").
1" Laurie Goodstein & Tamar Lewin, Victims of Mistaken Identity, Sikhs Pay a Pricefor Turbans,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at Al ("since the attacks, people who look Middle Eastern and South
Asian, whatever their religion or nation of origin, have been singled out for harassment, threats and
assaults"); Tamar Lewin & Gustav Niebuhr, Attacks and Harassment Continue on Middle Eastern
People and Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at B5 (describing a "continuing wave of attacks.
.. on Muslims ... and others who appear to be Middle Eastern").
154 Martinez, supra note 3, at 824-826.
155 C. DeMaggio, S. Galea & L.D. Richardson, Emergency Department Visits for Behavioral and
Mental Health Care after a TerroristAttack, ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED., 50(3), 327-334 (2007)
(describing the negative health consequences - including stress-related disorders - subsequent to
terrorist attack); Diane S. Lauderdale, Birth Outcomes for Arabic-Named Women in Cahfornia
before and after September 11, DEMOGRAPHY 43(1), 185, 187-188 (2006) ("Diverse sources
identify the weeks after 9/11 as a period when persons who were perceived to be Arabs in the
United States were victims of harassment, hate crimes, and workplace discrimination .

. .

. While

each pregnant woman of Arab descent in the United States might not have personally experienced
discrimination, it seems likely that concern about what might happen would be a widespread
stressor, perhaps especially for pregnant women").
"6 Lauderdale, supra note 155, at 197.
157 Martinez, supra note 3, at 811-14.
" Les B. Whitbeck, Gary W. Adams, Dan R. Hoyt, and Xiaojin Chen, Conceptualizing and
MeasuringHistoricalTrauma among American Indian People, 33(3/4) AM. J. OF CMTY. PSYCHOL.
119-130, June (2004); Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart & Lemyra M. DeBruyn, The American
Indian Holocaust:HealingHistorical Unresolved Grief AM. INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE MENTAL
HEALTH RES., 8(2) 60-82 (1998).
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defined as "the cumulative psychological wounding of an individual and his/her
group due to the history of genocide and other atrocities that American Indians
and other indigenous people experienced from European colonizers."l 5 9
V. Can One Escape from the State of Nature?
To escape from the state of nature, it would seem that constraints or
additional constraints might be placed on the dominant group in their interactions
with minorities. One way to do this may be.to use the Implicit Association Test
(IAT) for measuring racial bias in lawsuits that allege racial discrimination.
Social psychologists have found that members of the dominant group
may develop certain implicit attitudes or stereotypes regarding racial minorities
that are triggered by the presence of the racial minority.i'o These attitudes may be
unconscious.16' For example, members of the dominant group may learn negative
stereotypes regarding racial minorities, which may become implicit attitudes that
are retained in the memory.1 62 The IAT is a procedure that is used to determine
and measure such implicit racial bias. 16 3
There is an extensive body of research concerning the IAT - hundreds
of published studies - and over seven million IAT tests have been taken on line
at Harvard University's website.1 64 The studies have shown "that socially
dominant groups have implicit bias against subordinate groups (White over nonWhite, for example)."16 ' Thus, the tests show that three fourths of whites "display
an unconscious tendency to value white people over black people." 166 In addition,

159 David Williams & Selina A. Mohammed, Discrimination and Racial Disparities in Health:

Evidence and Needed Research, J. BEHAV. MED. 20, 30 (2009).
1" Kang & Banaji, supra note 74, at 1083-84 ("Significantly, the mental constructs that guide our
evaluations include beliefs (stereotypes) and feelings (prejudice) about entire social categories ....

They are automatically prompted by the mere presence of a target mapped into a particular social
category").
161 Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Frameworkfor Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U. CIN .L.
REV. 97, 104-05 (2010) (the term "implicit bias" is used to refer to the "notion that everyone holds

certain biases at an unconscious level, and these biases may influence our decision-making
processes in ways of which we are completely unaware").
162 John F. Dovidio, Samuel L. Gaertner, Kerry Kwakami & Gordon Hodson, Why Can't We Just
Get Along? Interpersonal Biases and InterracialDistrust, 8(2) CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND ETHNIC
MINORITY PSYCHOLOGY, 88-94 (2002) (describing the development of negative stereotypes); Kang
& Banaji, supra note 74, at 1494 (bias may come from "vicarious experience with the racial other,
transmitted through the media. If these experiences are somehow skewed, we should not be

surprised by the presence of pervasive implicit bias").
163 Kang & Banaji, supra note 74, at 1509 ("The Implicit Association Test ...

has become the

state-of-the-art measurement tool" of implicit bias).
1"
Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58
UCLA L. REV. 465, 473 (2010) ("over seven million completed tests"); Bruce Bower, The Bias
Finders, SCIENCE NEWS, April 22, 2006, Vol. 169 at 250-253.
165 Kang & Banaji, supra note 74, at 1512.
166 Bower, supra note 164, at 250.
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there is "persuasive evidence" that such implicit bias "predicts disparate"
treatment of racial minorities.' 67
The research developed in the IAT studies might be used in litigation
alleging race discrimination as "[s]ocial framework evidence" which "uses
general conclusions from tested, reliable and peer-reviewed social science
research and applies them to the case."168 Expert witness testimony would be
employed to provide such evidence to the jury which would then be used to find
facts in a particular case.' 69 Such structural framework evidence regarding
implicit sexism has been allowed in a recent case alleging gender
discrimination,' and therefore, such evidence regarding implicit racial bias
should be admissible in a case alleging race discrimination."'
In addition, one commentator has argued that the IAT should be
administered to prospective jurors during the jury selection process known as
voir dire.' 72 He argues that since jurors' decisions are affected by implicit bias,
the IAT should be used "to improve our ability to detect this bias in jurors and
remove those who are unable to approach a trial with relative neutrality." 7 3 He.
suggests that the use of the IAT is particularly important in light of the
constitutional right to a fair jury.' 7 4 In these ways, the IAT and its results might
be used to place constraints on the dominant group in an effort to escape the state
of nature.
Another possible way to escape the amoral state of nature is for judges to
reject legal positivism in favor of a non-positivist theory and approach to legal
decision-making. Positivism takes the position that law is separate or
autonomous from morality or morals.' 75 On the other hand, natural law theories
or "naturalism" deny the separation of law and morality and assert that the notion
of law incorporates notions of morals."' Thus, for example, according to the
leading contemporary naturalist, Ronald Dworkin, judges should decide cases by
using theories or principles that best explain the existing legal precedents and

167 Kang & Banaji, supra note 74, at 1514.

Kang & Lane, supra note 164, at 493-95.
Kang & Lane, supra note 168, at 493-94.
17 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 293-94 (1989).
17' Kang & Lane, supra note 168, at 494-95.
172 Dale Larson, A Fairand Implicitly ImpartialJury: An Argument for Administering the Implicit
Association Test during Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139 (2010).
17' Larson, supra note 172, at 142.
174
Id at 152-53.
175 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Limits ofJudicial Fidelity to Law: The Coxford Lecture, 24 CAN. J. L.
& JURIS. 305, 308 (2011) ("legal positivism. . . regards law as ultimately a matter of fact and not of
morality").
176 Ronald A. Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 165 (1982) ("any theory which
makes the content of law sometimes depend on the correct answer to some moral question is a
natural law theory"). See also Goldsworthy, supra note 175, at 308 ("Non-positivist theories
maintain that establishing what law is depends partly on considerations ofjustice").
168
169
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which are superior as a matter of moral theory.' 7 7 The use of such a naturalist
theory of judicial decision-making might enable us to escape the confines of the
amoral state of nature in making judicial decisions.
Significantly, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., urged the use of naturalism in.
law in his famous "Letter from Birmingham Jail."' 7 8 In the letter, he urged
resistance to laws that were inconsistent with morality.' 79 Instead, he urged that
just laws should be enacted by legislators or handed down by judges which
"uplift [the] human personality" and that dominant groups should not seek to
apply laws to minorities that they would not be willing to have applied to
themselves-i.e., laws which violate the golden rule-do not do to others what
you would not have done to yourself.so Given this, we can understand Martin
Luther King, Jr., as attempting to lift racial minorities out of the state of nature by
imposing moral constraints on the majority in his philosophy of law.
VI. State of Nature Theory, the Black/White Binary, the Multiracial
Paradigm Shift, Seeking Patterns in the Area of Race and Law, and the
Heideggerian Clearing and Race
Roy Brooks and Kirsten Widner have recently argued that race scholars
should, in producing scholarship, retain the black/white binary or paradigm-the
view that the relationship between blacks and whites should be "central to racial
analysis."'

177

Dworkin, supra note 176, at 165 ("According to naturalism, judges should decide hard cases by

interpreting the political structure of their community in the following, perhaps special way: by
trying to find the bestjustificationthey can find, in principles of political morality, for the structure
as a whole, from the most profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for
example, the private law of tort or contract"); Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, supra note 176, at

166 (judges are to "try to justify, under some set of principles, those parts of the legal background
which seem to them immediately relevant").
18 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW

58-62 (David M. Adams ed., 1992). Martin Luther King, Jr. is an "icon embodying social justice
and community compassion values." Jeffrey W. Stempel, Adam, Martin and John: Iconography,
Infrastructureand America's PathologicalInconsistency about Medical Insurance, 14 CONN. INS.

L. J. 229, 234 (2008)
"9 King, supra note 178, at 60 ("One may well ask, 'How can you advocate breaking some laws
and obeying others?' The answer is found in the fact that there are two types of laws: there are just
and there are unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that 'An unjust law is no law at all."').
See also Charles 1. Lugosi, How Secular Ideology Is Marginalizingthe Rule of Law and Catholic
Contributionsto Law and Society II: The Ten Commandments and the Rejection of Divine Law in

American Jurisprudence, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 145, 153 (2008) ("Natural law is also found in
the Letter from the Birmingham Jail, wherein Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. cited to Thomas Aquinas
to claim the high moral ground in his civil rights war against racism in America").
"8o King, supra note 178, at 60.
'"'Roy L. Brooks and Kirsten Widner, In Defense of the Black/White Binary: Reclaiming a
Tradition ofCivil Rights Scholarship, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR. AM. L & POL'Y 107, 109-10 (2010). See
also Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary ParadigmofRace: The Normal
Science ofAmerican Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1213, 1219 (1997) ("The most pervasive and
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In advancing their position, they suggest that retaining a focus on blacks
and whites will not "distort our understanding of civil rights history and
racism."182 They argue that the retention of a black/white paradigm is justified
because the "racial histories" of other minority groups is "not a prerequisite for
understanding civil rights" and that the situation of blacks is unique.1 3 As a
result, they conclude that "it makes sense for African-American and other civil
rights scholars to focus on black/white racial relations" and that "racial problems
facing particular groups must be analyzed separately."' 8 4
State of nature theory provides a reason to reject the current effort to
retain or return to a black/white binary or paradigm and instead adopt a
multiracial paradigm in the area of race. Contrary to Brooks and Widner,
retention of the black/white binary cannot be justified on the ground that the
racial histories of other minorities are not necessary for understanding civil rights
or because the situation of blacks is unique. State of nature theory shows that the
true condition of racial minorities cannot be understood unless one considers the
condition or histories of other subordinated groups.'81 Once the other racial
groups are considered, it is possible to see that the dominant group has often
treated racial minorities as if they were in a state of nature-i.e., with an absence
of legal or moral constraints. Given this common situation, it is also possible to
powerful paradigm of race in the United States is the Black/White binary paradigm. I define this
paradigm as the conception that race in America consists, either exclusively or primarily, of only
two constituent racial groups, the Black and the White"); Leslie Espinoza & Angela Harris,
Afterward: Embracing the Tar Baby-LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1585, 1596 (1997) (describing "black exceptionalism" as the assertion that "African-Americans
play a unique and central role in American social, political, cultural, and economic life, and have
done so since the nation's founding" and that "the 'black-white paradigm' . . . is no accident or
mistake; rather it reflects an important truth"); Kevin R. Johnson, The Future of Latino Legal
Scholarship, 2 HARv. LATINO REv. 101, 110 (1997) ("civil rights concerns traditionally have been
seen through the black-white paradigm, a longstanding feature of race relations discourse in this
country"); Anthony V. Alfieri, ProsecutingRace, 48 DUKE L. J. 1157, 1185 (1999) ("race collapses
into a binary white/black opposition in spite of the vagaries of color"); Mari Matsuda, Looking to
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 323, 335 n.50
(1987) (referring to African-Americans as "the paradigm victim group of [American] history"
inasmuch as African-Americans have a "400-year experience of sustained and brutal American
racism"); Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 900
("no other group compares to African-Americans" with respect to the need for remedies for
racism).
182 Brooks and Widner, In Defense of the Black/White Binary, supra note 181, at 122-24.
183 Id. at 123-24; 131-141.
184 Id. at 142. See also Espinoza & Harris, supra note 181, at 1603 ("the black white paradigm ...
rightly places black people at the center of any analysis of American culture or American white
supremacy" and "indeed the story of 'race' itself is the story of the construction of blackness and
whiteness").
18s See also George A. Martinez, African-Americans, Latinos and the Construction of Race:
Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 213, 221-22 (1998) (arguing from a
philosophical perspective "that the truth about the various minority groups (Latinos, AsianAmericans, Native Americans and African-Americans) cannot be ascertained without considering
propositions about the various groups").
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see that the situation of blacks is not unique-all groups must often contend with
a similar state of nature-like situation. Given this, it makes more sense at this
time in history to broaden the discussion, operate from within a multiracial
paradigm in the area of race and focus on commonalities among the various
racial groups. It is time to connect the dots. The epistemic coalition among the
racial groups is arising.'1 6 This is the way to achieve knowledge in the area of
race. Race theorists, therefore, should advance theories to connect the dots
among the various racial groups through the lens of a multiracial paradigm and
attempt to explain as much as possible of what we observe in the area of race and
law.
In this regard, state of nature theory helps one understand the situation of
African-Americans today. For instance, Roy Brooks has observed that "[g]iven
the contradictory racial dynamics that define the age of Obama-unprecedented
racial advancement for selected individuals' 87 and continued racial frustration for
the group-it is not easy to conceptualize the problem of race." 88 As I have
argued above, state of nature theory explains that this "contradictory" situation
has come about through amoral state-of-nature judicial decision-making, which
has restructured affirmative action to elevate certain "leaders" of racial groups
whereas the condition of the remainder of the groups will be left unchanged.1 89
Thus, a multiracial approach does help one to better understand issues of civil
rights.
This reconstruction of affirmative action would also help explain the
current situation of African-Americans with respect to whether they will benefit
from affirmative action programs. Kevin Brown and Jeannine Bell have recently
pointed out that "Ascendant Blacks"-African-Americans who are descended
from kin who were subordinated in the United States-are "likely more
underrepresented in affirmative action."'9 0 Instead, the beneficiaries of

1' See id. (arguing that "Latinos, African-Americans. Asian-Americans and Native-Americans
must establish an epistemic coalition to achieve knowledge about themselves and their place in the
world").
1" See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Postracial Society, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1555, 1564 (2013) ("Oprah Winfrey, Denzel Washington, Eddie
Murphy, and countless other successful Blacks in business, law, medicine and politics are
reminders that many Blacks have made it to the top of American society in terms of wealth, power
and fame").
1" Roy L. Brooks, The Crisis of the Black Politicianin the Age of Obama, 53 How. L. J. 699, 701
(2010).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 12-24.
19o Kevin Brown and Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the
Increasing Underrepresentationof Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher EducationalInstitutions,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1230, 1236 (2008). See also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of
Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141 (2007) (affirmative action programs are failing to select the
descendants of slaves in the United States); Tom 1. Romero & Kevin Brown, The Social
Reconstruction ofRace & Ethnicity of the Nation'sLaw Students: A Request to the ABA, AALS, and
LSAAC for Changes in Reporting Requirements, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1133, 1140 ("[L]aw
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affirmative action tend to be black immigrants, biracials and their children.i 9
What has happened? Because of amoral state-of-nature-like legal decisionmaking, the Supreme Court in Grutter has established that affirmative action
programs need only promote certain "leaders" and the situation of the remaining
racial minorities is left unchanged.' 92 Given this, it may be that affirmative action
officers have decided that black immigrants and biracials are able to fill the role
of being "leaders." According to this logic, the condition of Ascendant Blacks
would then be left unaltered.
In any event, the paradigm has already shifted from a black/white
paradigm to a multiracial paradigm in doing scholarship on race. Thomas Kuhn
in his classic work on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,' 93 has pointed out
that new paradigms become normal science or the reigning paradigm once the
new paradigm is incorporated "into textbooks from which the future practitioner
will learn his trade."l94 Kuhn explains the role of textbooks in scientific
revolutions or paradigm shifts as follows:
Textbooks, however, being pedagogic vehicles for the
perpetuation of normal science, have to be rewritten in whole or
in part whenever the language, problem structure, or standards of
normal science change. In short, they have to be rewritten in the
aftermath of each scientific revolution .... '95
The relevant textbooks in law have already been rewritten to reflect the
multiracial paradigm shift away from a black/white paradigm. The leading
textbooks in the area of race take a multiracial approach and consider the racial
histories or situation of all the major racial groups in analyzing race and law.' 6
For instance, the authors of Race and Races explain their multiracial approach to
the study of race as follows:
Each of us has taught and written about race for most of our
careers. We have all confronted the need for and the difficulty of
assembling varied interdisciplinary and historical materials to
schools may be in the process of ethnically cleansing their buildings of Ascendant Blacks .....
191 Brown & Bell, supra note 190, at 1230. See also Onwuachi-Willig, Legacy Blacks, supra note
190, at 1145 (affirmative action programs are promoting "either mixed-race students or only first or
second
generation black Americans").
192
See supra text accompanying notes 12-24.
193 THOMAS S. KUIHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS ( nd Edition 1970).
2
1

' Id. at 46.

195

Id. at 137.

196 See generally JUAN F. PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA P. HARRIS, JEAN STEFANCIC AND

STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA
(Second Edition, 2007); TIMOTHY DAVIS, KEVIN R. JOHNSON & GEORGE A. MARTINEZ, A READER
ON RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW: A MULTIRACIAL APPROACH (2001); RICHARD
DELGADO AND JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE (Second Edition
2000); RACHEL F. MORAN AND DEVON W. CARBADO, RACE LAW STORIES (2008).
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cover race and racism comprehensively in a manner that
accounted for each of the principal racial groups in the United
States African-Americans, Indians, Latinos/as, Asian
Americans, and Whites .... This casebook .. . presents[s] race
and racism in a way that corresponds to the racial complexity of
United States society.197
Similarly, the authors of a Reader on Race, Civil Rights and American
Law explain their adoption of a multiracial paradigm as follows:
This reader offers a range of legal literature, analyzing major
issues of race and civil rights in modem United States. Previous
scholarship in this field has tended to focus on the relationship
between whites and African-Americans. Modem social life,
however, has become considerably more complex, particularly
with the changing demographics of the twenty first century ...
As influential sociologist Nathan Glazer has emphatically
declared, "We are all multiculturalists now." . . . Premised on
this principle, the anthology considers race and civil rights from
a wide range of minority perspectives and offers readings from
African-American, Asian-American, Latina/o and Native
American perspectives on the pressing civil rights issues of the
1 98

day."

Likewise, the authors of Race Law Stories explain that in putting
together their text they, too, have adopted a multiracial perspective: "[I]n
elaborating these themes, we are careful to recognize the complexity created by
America's multiracial population. We have chosen cases that include Blacks,
Latinas/os, Asian-Americans, Native Americans and Whites."l 99
Evidence of the multiracial paradigm shift is further found in the fact that
race scholars working in the new paradigm are seeing and studying new and
different things. As Thomas Kuhn has explained, as paradigms shift,
[T]he world itself changes with them. Led by a new paradigm,
scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even
more important, during revolutions scientists see new and
different things when looking with familiar instruments in places
they have looked before. It is rather as if the professional
community had suddenly been transported to another planet
where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined

197 PEREA ET AL, supra note 196, at 1.
1" DAVIS, ET AL, supra note 196, at xvii.
'9 MORAN AND CARBADO, supra note 196, at 35.
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by unfamiliar ones as well .... Nevertheless, paradigm changes

do cause scientists to see the world of their research-engagement
differently. 20 0
For example, one of the earliest legal scholars to expressly call, in effect,
for a multiracial paradigm shift and operate within the new paradigm was
Professor Neil Gotanda. 20 1 In reviewing a book dealing with the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II, he argues that the subject of JapaneseAmericans must be viewed as "one component in the larger question of race in
American law."202 Directly challenging the black/white binary, he contends
"[w]hile in legal history the discussion of race has usually meant the analysis of
the legal condition of Blacks, I suggest an examination of non-black racial
minorities-as a distinct mode of analysis." 203 Accordingly, as a scholar working
with the new multiracial paradigm, he began to study new and different things. In
particular, he argues that in studying "Other Non- Whites, " such as JapaneseAmericans, one must consider that the notion of "foreignness" is an aspect of
their racial identity.204 Specifically, a key characteristic of other non-Whites is
that "even American-born non-Whites are somehow foreign." 205 He argues that
this "underserved stigma" of foreignness serves as a reason for unjust laws
against such racial minorities. 206 Similarly, other Asian-American scholars began
to operate within the multiracial paradigm. For instance, Mari Matsuda analyzed
accent discrimination-a type of discrimination that has been employed against
Asian-Americans and others. 207 Lisa Ikemoto examined the story of conflict
between Korean-Americans and African-Americans in the civil disorder that took
place in Los Angeles in the early 1990s. 208 Robert Chang expressly called for the
development of an Asian-American Legal Scholarship. 2 09 Leti Volpp explored!
the use of the "cultural defense" in criminal cases and its impact on Asian
women.2o Pat Chew explored certain "paradoxes of public perception and

200

KUHN, supra note 193, at 111.

201 See generally Neil Gotanda, "Other Non- Whites" in American Legal History: A Review of
"Justiceat War, " 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1985).
202
1d at 1188.

Id
Id
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L. J. 1329 (1991).
208 See generally Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1581 (1993).
209 See generally Robert S. Chang, Toward An Asian-American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1993).
20 See generally Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense,"
203

204

17 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 57 (1994).
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contradictory reality" regarding the status of Asian-Americans.211 Margaret Chon
examined the need for Asian-American storytelling in law. 2 12
Similarly, Latino legal scholars moved into the new paradigm and began
to study new and different topics. For example, in an early article, Richard
Delgado and Vicky Palacios focused on a topic of particular concern to MexicanAmericans and moved beyond the black/white binary in arguing that MexicanAmericans should be recognized as a "class" for purposes of bringing civil rights
class action lawsuits-a major device for bringing about reform of social
institutions.2 13 Juan Perea and Christopher Cameron examined discriminatory
laws targeting Latinos on the basis of the language they often speak-Spanish.214
I examined the Mexican-American litigation experience in the area of civil rights
and the legal construction of the race of Mexican-Americans. 2 15 Kevin Johnson
and Jan Haney Lopez analyzed racial issues impacting Latinos and others arising
in the context of immigration law. 2 16 Margaret Montoya and Michael Olivas
pioneered the use of narrative in the context of analyzing Latinas/os and the
law. 217 Latino Critical Legal Theory also emerged as an expressly named subject
position 218 in the 1990s.219

&

211 See Pat K. Chew, Asian-Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM.
MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (1994).
212 See generally Margaret H.R. Chon, On the Need for Asian-American Narratives in Law: Ethnic
Specimens, Native Informants, Storytellingand Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L. J. 4 (1995).
213 See Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class
under Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 418 (1975).
214 See generally Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1992); Christopher David Ruiz
Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understandingthe Language of Title VII
Decisions, Approving Speak-English-Only Rules As the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino
Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1347 (1997).
215 See generally George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, JudicialDiscretion and the MexicanAmerican Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 555 (1994); George A.
Martinez, The Legal ConstructionofRace: Mexican-Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L.
REv. 321 (1997).
216 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino
Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42 (1995); IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (David. R. Roediger eds., 1996).
217 See generally Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas y Greilas: Un/masking the Self While
Un/braidingLatina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 185 (1994); Michael A.
Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather'sStories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders as

Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L. J. 425 (1990). Margaret Montoya has recently explained the
meaning of her "Mascaras article" as being "about finding one's voice and speaking one's truths,

however unconventional, and, in doing so, challenging the epistemological and ideological
constraints of traditional legal discourse." Margaret E. Montoya, Mascarasy Trenzas: Reflexiones
Un Proyeto de Identidad y Analysis a Traves de Veinte Adihos, 36 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 469

(2013).
218 Political theorist Chantal Mouffe explains the notion of "subject position" as follows:

Within every society, each social agent is inscribed in a multiplicity of social
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Likewise Native American legal scholars moved away from the
black/white paradigm and began to examine new topics. For instance, Robert
Williams studied the European roots of the effort to assimilate Indian tribal
culture into dominant western European culture as a means of appropriating
Indian natural resources. 220 Williams also examined how the underlying basis of
American federal Indian law is found in a "colonizing [European] legal discourse
[which] denies respect to the Indian's version of an Americanized way of life." 221
Williams therefore called for "the decolonization and Americanization" of
American federal Indian law. 2 22 Luralene Tapahe analyzed the failure of
American courts to properly protect the right to practice Native American
religions. 223 Rebecca Tsosie explored Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall's Indian law jurisprudence. 224 Alex Tallchief Skibine examined the
right to tribal self-government in American law. 22 5
Beyond this, further evidence that a multiracial paradigm shift has
occurred is found in the fact that scholars working within this paradigm are
engaged in the process of theoretical integration or interdisciplinary research-,
Paradigm shifts may only come about "through the process of theoretical

relations-not only social relations of production but also the social relations,
among others, of sex, race nationality, and vicinity. All these social relations
determine positionalities or subject positions and every social agent is therefore
the locus of many subject positions and cannot be reduced to only one. Thus,
someone inscribed in the relations of production as a worker is also a man or
woman, white or black, Catholic or Protestant, French or German, and so on.
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and New PoliticalSubjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy, in
MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 89-90 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds.,
1988).
219 See generally Francisco Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory and Post Identity.
Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practicesto Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L. J. 1 (1996);
Francisco Valdes, Foreword: Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence and
Latinalo Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. R. 1 (1997) (describing "the rapid and increasing
adoption of a 'LatCrit' identification among Latina/o academics (and others) to describe a new and
particularized subject position").
220 See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of
the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. I (1983).
221 Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizingthe White Man'sJurisprudence, 1986 Wisc. L. REV. 219, 290 (1986).
222 Williams, The Algebra ofFederalIndian Law, supra note 221, at 290.
223 See Luralene D. Tapahe, After the Religious Freedom Act: Still No Equal Protectionfor First
American Worshippers, 24 N.M. L. REv. 331 (1994).
224 See Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of
Justice Thurgood Marshall'sIndian Law Jurisprudence,26 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 495 (1994).
225 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations
with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L.
REV. 1105.
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integration" or interdisciplinary research. 226 Although there is a tendency for
researchers operating within one discipline to resist the effort to assimilate the
insights of another discipline, sciences can only make progress when they
incorporate theories and ideas from other disciplines. 227 For instance, Robert
Williams drew on Western European intellectual history to analyze American
Indian law.228 I have used philosophical theory to analyze issues affecting Latinos
and other racial minorities. 2 29 Kevin Johnson has applied psychological theory to
analyze racial issues impacting various racial groups in the context of
immigration law.23 0 Ian Haney-Lopez has examined institutional racism against
Mexican-Americans in the context of jury selection using the methodology of the
"New Institutionalism, a genre within organizational sociology." 231' Richard
Delgado has applied post-colonial theory in analyzing Latinos and other racial
groups. Robert Chang and others have applied narrative and epistemological
theory to analyze issues impacting Asian-Americans and others. 233 Keith Aoki
and others have applied the insights of the discipline of geography to analyze
issues affecting various racial groups.234
State of nature theory advances this multiracial paradigm in considering
the situation of the various racial groups in developing a theory to help explain
and understand race and American law. The paradigm shift away from a
black/white binary to a multiracial paradigm has already been accomplished. It
makes no sense to attempt to return to the past of an older black/white paradigm
any more than it would make sense to attempt to return to an older paradigm
which held that the sun revolves around the earth instead of the current paradigm
which holds that the earth revolves around the sun.

Jonathon A. Cooper, Anthony Walsh & Lee Ellis, Is Criminology Moving toward a Paradigm
Shift?: Evidence from a Survey of the American Society of Criminology, 21 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE EDUCATION 332-397 (2010).
227 Id. at 333-34.
226

228

ROBERT A.

WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN

DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
229 See George A. Martinez, Latinos,

IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:

THE

Assimilation and the Law: A PhilosophicalPerspective, 20

CHiCANO-LATINO L. REv. 1 (1999); Martinez, Race, American Law and the State of Nature, supra
note 3 (applying philosophical state of nature theory to issues of race).
230 See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A Magic
Mirror into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L. J. 1111 (1998).
231 lan F. Haney-Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial

Discrimination, 109 YALE L. J. 1717, 1723 (2000).
232 See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Corrido:Race, Post-colonial Theory, and U.S. Civil Rights, 60
VAND. L. REv. 169 (2007).
233 See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian-American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory,
Post-Structuralismand NarrativeSpace, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1243, 1268-1286 (1993).
234 See Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the 'Third World in InternationalLaw and
CriticalRace Theory, 45 VILL. L. REv. 913 (2000); George A. Martinez, Arizona, Immigration and

Latinos: The Epistemology of Whiteness, the Geography of Race, Interest Convergence and the
View from the Perspective of Critical Theory, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 175 (2012).
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Beyond this, state of nature theory, by seeking out patterns in law-i.e.,
the dominant group tending to act without legal or moral constraints as it deals
with racial minorities-is consistent with scientific methodology. Philosophers of
science explain the importance of patterns in science:
The concept of "pattern" is fundamental to science because the
"completely disordered is unimaginable" and "if we are going to
say anything at all, some structure is certain to be involved ....
Put simply, intelligibility in science requires that objects be
patterned.23 5
Thus, as Robert MacArthur has observed, "to do science is to search for
repeated patterns."2 36 Accordingly, if we are going to understand law and make it
intelligible, then there must be patterns in law that we can discern. Scholars
working in the area of race and American law, therefore, should look for such
patterns. State of nature theory is an effort to bring such patterns into view in
constructing a theory of how the dominant group tends to relate to racial
minorities.
Finally, it seems possible to place a Heideggerian interpretation on state
of nature theory as applied in the area of race and American law. According to
the philosopher Martin Heidegger, there is a "cultural context" or "clearing in
which things show themselves." 237 Hubert Dreyfus explains this cultural context
or clearing or "understanding of what it is for anything to be at all"-e.g., a
human being or thing-as follows:
The shared practices into which we are socialized, moreover,
provide a background understanding of what matters and what it
makes sense to do, on the basis of which we can direct our
actions. This understanding of being creates what Heidegger
calls a clearing in which things and people can show up as

Searching for Patterns, Hunting for Causes: Robert MacArthur, the
Mathematical Naturalist quoting G.E. Hutchinson, The Concept of Pattern in Ecology, 105
235 Jay Odenbaugh,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES OF PHILADELPHIA 1, 2-3 (1953).
236 ROBERT H. MACARTHUR, GEOGRAPHICAL
ECOLOGY 1 (1972). Cf also KEITH

DEVLIN,

MATHEMATICS: THE SCIENCE OF PATTERNS 3 (1994) ("Mathematics is the science of patterns. What
the mathematician does is examine ... patterns.. . . Those patterns can be real or imagined ....
They can arise from the world around us, from the depths of space and time, or from the inner

workings of the human mind").
237
Carol
White,
The
Beginning
of the
History of Being,
at
Theodore R. Schatzki,
http://www.scu.edulcas/philosophy/upload/Chapte&/o206.pdf,

323,
Early

Heidegger on Being, The Clearing, and Realism at 81, in HEIDEGGER: A CRITICAL READER (Hubert

L. Dreyfus & Harrison Hall eds., 1992) ("Perhaps the most prominent concept in Heidegger's
philosophy is that of a clearing in which entities can be, a space or realm of illumination in whose
light things can show or manifest themselves to people. Heidegger's central concern, throughout
his philosophical career, was to understand the nature and constitution of this clearing").
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mattering and meaningful for us. We do not produce the
clearing. It produces us as the kind of human beings that we
are.238

In the current cultural context or clearing, then, racial minorities in
America tend to show up as being in the state of nature in the context of their
relationship to the dominant group.
IV. Conclusion
In this article, I have sought to further develop state of nature theory by
considering new examples that illustrate and provide evidence in support of the
theory. In addition, I have explored whether it is possible to escape from the state
of nature and explained how state of nature theory advances a multiracial
paradigm shift in the area of race and is consistent with scientific practice in that
it seeks to discover patterns in the area of race and law. Thus, I provide a number
of new examples to illustrate state of nature theory, including: (1) amoral
decision-making in the context of affirmative action; (2) the lifting of constraints
off of the majority in the creation of new federal pleading standards for federal
lawsuits and in the areas of campaign financing, voting rights, and international
law; (3) psychological studies that show discriminatory behavior where there are
no legal constraints; (4) the exercise of the key state of nature virtues - force
and fraud - against Native Americans; (5) the existence of a state-of-nature-like
situation in the removal of Native Americans from certain areas of the country;
(6) a state-of-nature-like existence outside of the American polity on the part of
African-Americans, Asian-Americans and Latinos: and (7) the link between
racial neoliberalism and the state of nature. I also argue that acting as if in the
state of nature has led to the consciousness of guilt in the dominant group. In
addition, I consider evidence regarding the relative health of racial minorities,
which suggests that racial minorities are enduring a state of nature existence. I
also suggest some possible ways to escape from the state of nature. Finally, .1
argue that state of nature theory is a way to advance the multiracial paradigm
shift in the area of race and law and that scholars working the area of race and
law should follow the example of science and seek to discover and reveal the
existence of patterns in the area of race and law.

238 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and
Politics at 296, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER (Charles Guignon ed., 1993). See
also Charles B. Guignon, Introduction at I1, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER, Supra

note 238 ("Dasein is said to be a 'clearing' or a 'lighting' through which entities can stand forth as
such and such. In other words it is because we take a stand on our being in the world- because we
are 'understanding,' in Heidegger's special use of this word-that we engage in familiar, skillful
practices in everyday contexts, and we thereby open a leeway or field of free play . .. where things
can stand out as counting or mattering in some determinate ways").

